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Interorganizational Network Coordination
under Stress Caused by Repeated Threats of
Disasters
Naim Kapucu, Thomas Bryer, Vener Garayev, and Tolga Arslan

Abstract
The study addresses interorganizational learning and coordination as well as their impact on
collaborative capacity building in disaster environments. Community coordination requires
communication and planning to take necessary precautions in the face of severe threats of
disasters. The historically unique case of the four Florida hurricanes of 2004 is used to assess
coordinated response under conditions of repeated threats of hurricanes. The repeated threat
scenario suggests that emergency managers must vigilantly work to keep the partnering public,
private, and nonprofit agencies and citizens informed and apprised of the seriousness of the
situation. The research examines four hurricane response operations drawing on content analyses
of news and situation reports. Content analysis provides interorganizational interactions that are
subject to network analysis revealing information about: (1) how critical actors interacted and
coordinated, (2) sub-groups under each network, and (3) each network as a system. Using network
analysis in analyzing disaster response systems is a new way of exploring the issues from another
perspective and through a new methodology. The article showcases the potential use of network
analysis in both organizational and emergency management research.
KEYWORDS: hurricanes, repeated
management, collaborative capacity
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We expect that people will learn from disasters. We also expect
‘metaphorically’ that organizations will learn as well. However, organizations do
not have the cognitive capacity to learn. Organizations learn through their
members (i.e. leaders, managers) (Comfort 1999, 1996; Sabatier 1987). On the
other hand, organizations can also be utilized to eliminate the limitations of
human learning (Jones 2001; Kayes 2004, 2002). In order for organizational
learning to occur, organizations need to interact, to share information and
resources (Argote 1999; Ostrom 1998; Scott and Davis 2007). However,
organizational learning is not simply the sum of individual learning.
Organizational learning occurs as organizations adapt existing skills to new and
emerging problems (Birkland 2006). Organizations learn when individual
experiences and learning are embedded in organizational routines and practices
which contribute to organizational effectiveness (Kim 1998). The article uses
learning from previous hurricanes in coordinating resources in response to
repeated disasters.
Social scientists have studied the resilience of organizations under stress
(Tierney 2000) and the collapse of sense-making in organizations under threat
(Weick 2001). The scope and complexity of response operations require a flexible
learning approach that engages each of the emergency management agencies and
requires adjustments in their performance (Carley and Harrald 1997; Kapucu
2009; Orton and Weick 1990; Weick and Sutliffe 2001). When a disaster occurs,
we hope that organizations learn from one another and perform at levels that lie
beyond the capacity of the individual organizations acting alone. As emergency
response and management increasingly rely on inter-organizational response to
disasters (Corbacioglu and Kapucu 2006; Kapucu 2006; Moynihan 2005, 2006),
research on how organizations learn in the face of repeated disasters takes on
heightened importance. Disasters produce unique combinations of choices,
actions, and reasoning that can not be predicted. This perspective better represents
the complexity of disaster situations and the problematic nature of post-event
evaluations.
Building collaborative capacity and coordinating community resources in
response to incidents is a major problem for public leaders trying to ensure
effective public response to repeated threats (Drabek 1987, 2003; Fitzpatrick
1999; Waugh 2006). Repeated threats and threat warnings from disease,
terrorism, and hurricanes can create community numbness causing underestimation and under-preparedness. This can result in increased public exposure
to imminent dangers, may cause additional loss of property and life, and lead to
slower recovery (Bazerman and Watkins 2004; Burby 1998; Williams and
Olaniran 1998). In 2004, the state of Florida was struck by four consecutive major
hurricanes within a period of six weeks. Hurricane Charley made landfall on
August 13, Hurricane Frances on September 5, Hurricane Ivan on September 16,
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and Hurricane Jeanne on September 25. Combined, the hurricanes killed 117
people and caused more than an estimated $45 billion in damages (FDEM 2004).
State officials estimated that more than 9.5 million people evacuated Florida
during the historic hurricane season – 1.9 million during Hurricane Charley, 2.8
million during Francis, more than 2 million during Hurricane Ivan, and nearly 2
million during Hurricane Jeanne (FEMA 2005). Nevertheless, the repeated strikes
provided a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to study the effect of multiple,
consecutive incidents on inter-organizational operations (see Figure 1 for path of
the hurricanes and the impacted regions). They also provided an opportunity to
study government agency response from immediate past emergency management
experiences and to explore their effectiveness in disaster response operations
(Birkland 1997, 2006; Kayes 2002, Kettl 2004; Khademian 2004). Effectiveness
in this study is defined as ‘collaborative capacity building’ in response to
disasters, and emphasize the importance of information sharing and interaction
among responding agencies (Weber and Khademian 2008).

Figure 1: The Path of the Four Hurricanes in 2004 in Florida
The historically unique case of the four hurricanes of 2004 in Florida is
used to assess inter-organizational operations under conditions of repeated
disasters. The research examines government agencies’ (local and state) role in
building collaborative capacity in response to repeated disasters. The research
uses data from content analysis of government documents, newspaper reports and
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interviews. This article contributes to emergency management literature and
specifically to inter-organizational operations under stress (Dynes and Tierney
1994; Fischer 1998; Flin, Salas, Strub, and Martin 1997; McLoughlin 1985;
Mileti 1999; Pellig 2003; Seeger et al. 2003; Tierney, Lindell, and Perry 2001;
Waugh 2000). The inter-organizational strategies identified by public managers
during the response to hurricanes can also be applicable to the response to other
natural and manmade disasters. Network analysis has a potential to contribute to
emergency management research as a theoretical lens and an analytical tool
(Durland and Fredericks 2006; Kilduff and Tsai 2007; Mandell and Keast 2007;
Provan, Veazie, Staten, and Teufel-Shone 2005).
Theoretical Background
In the field of public administration, there have been significant theoretical
discussions on policy networks, collaborative decision making, and network
management (Agranoff and McGuire 2003; Berry, Brower, Choi, Goa, Jang,
Kwon, and Word 2004; Gray 1989; Nohria and Eccies 1992; Kickert Eric-Hans
Klijn, and Koopanjan 1997). Simon (1947, 1996) discusses how government
agencies learn from experience and adapt to the changes in the environment.
Cyert and March (1963) conceptualize organizations as “adaptive institutions”
that respond to environmental changes by changing decision protocols and
problem-solving activities.
Networks facilitate interaction, decision-making, cooperation, and
organizational learning. Scholars also state that collaboration can result in
interorganizational learning (Blatner, Carroll, Daniels, and Walker 2001; Daniels
and Walker 2001). The scope and complexity of response operations requires a
flexible approach that engages each of the emergency management agencies so
they adjust their performance in accordance with changing conditions and
demands on other responding organizations (Kilduff and Tsai 2007; Powell 1990;
Thompson 2007; Weick and Roberts 1993; Weick and Sutliffe 2001).
Organizations and individuals learn through processes of knowledge acquisition,
information dissemination, information interpretation, and organizational memory
(Axelrod 1997). Disasters may instigate organizational learning.
New knowledge, understanding, and insights, for example, often arise as a
consequence of crisis. Crisis creates a time of intense self-reflection and
debriefing as members actively seek to understand what went wrong and
why. Information is rapidly distributed during a crisis because of
heightened and unified attention. Because crisis creates high uncertainty
by disrupting established expectations and prompts the search for
information. (Seeger et al. 2003: 18)
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Other research suggests that organizations will tend to not learn during disaster
unless there is a concerted push to do so. Organizations may become rigid and
defensive, particularly if there is criticism of the organization’s operations during
disaster management (Birkland 2006; Janis 1989).
Busenberg (2001) defines learning as “a process in which individuals
apply new information and ideas to policy decisions” (p. 22). Morgan (1997)
describes the organization in one image as a brain, using ‘cybernetic’ theory and
‘holographic’ concepts and characterizes the organization in a “state of flux as an
encoded logic of change,” with a tendency for organizations to be self-producing
systems and random variation as a source of change. Entropy and the tendency to
run down are true for relatively closed systems. The network and complex
adaptive systems theories suggest that there will be new emerging forms that will
shape society in new and productive ways (Buchanan 2002; Holland 1998; Kiel
1994; Kilduff and Tsai 2007; Mackenzie 1991; Wagenaar 2007).
Comfort (1996) notes the inappropriateness of simple, linear models to
capture the conditions in disaster environments in which “there are too many
agents involved in performing too many different functions simultaneously under
radically altered conditions to attribute direct, linear causality to any one agent or
condition” (p. 3). This perspective better represents the complexity of disaster
situations and the problematic nature of post-event evaluations. Weick (1993,
1995) states that information is the common raw material that all organizations
and individuals process. Through communication, participants collectively
interpret and make sense of information in their environment. Ostrom (1998)
explores the concept of collective action and learning among organizations in
dynamic environments. Using the concept of self-organization and learning by a
single actor as an initial point of action, Ostrom observes that these processes of
learning and adaptation extend to a set of interacting organizations and agencies.
These interactions are critical to understanding the dynamics of complex systems
(Buchanan 2002), such as those characteristic of disaster environments.
Networks and complex adaptive systems can lead to resilient
communities, which have the ability to mitigate hazards, contain the effects of
disasters when they occur, and carry out activities in ways that minimize social
disruption and mitigate the effects of future disaster events. Resilient communities
are characterized by reduced failure, measured in terms of lives lost, damage, and
negative social and economic impacts, and reduced time to recovery – that is,
more rapid restoration of the social systems and institutions to their normal, predisaster levels of functioning (Wildawsky 1971). The Resilience Multidisciplinary
Center for Earthquake Engineering Research (MCEER 2002) has identified four
general properties that can be applied to all systems and to the elements that
comprise systems:
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robustness (ability to withstand the forces generated by a hazard agent without
loss or significant deterioration of function;
resourcefulness (capacity to apply material, informational, and human
resources to remedy disruptions when they occur);
redundancy (the extent to which elements, systems, or other units of analysis
exist that are capable of satisfying the performance requirements of a social
unit in the event of loss or disruption threatening functionality);
and, rapidity (the ability to contain loses and restore system or other units in a
timely manner). (MCEER, 2002)

Public organizations can contribute to resilience in a society by collaborating with
nonprofit and private organizations in response to and recover from disasters.
Organizational learning requires human connections (Argote 1999;
Nonaka 1994). Researchers have examined the relational components of
knowledge transfer (Levin and Cross 2004) and the conditions under which
knowledge is transferred to assist organizations in becoming learning
organizations (Argyris and Schon 1978, 1996; Garvin 1993; Goh 1998).
Effective organizational learning requires prior experience and intense effort
among emergency response agencies (Cohen, and Levinthal 1990; Kim 1998;
Rochet, Karamidas, and Bout 2008). The study assumes that a response system
composed of multiple agencies and jurisdictions will be able to learn and adapt
more appropriately to the repeated threats in a given region than uncoordinated
efforts by agencies acting independently to meet the same challenges (Comfort
1999; Comfort and Kapucu 2006; Kauffman 1993; McEntire 2002; Schneider
1995).

Increased
density of
coordination

Public sector
leadership

Shared
information
Shared
resources

Repeated
threat of
Disasters
Multiorganizations
coordination

Use of
information
technologies

Collaborative
Capacity Building
Interorganizational
coordination

- Better
coordination
- Resilient
community
response

Figure 2: Organizational Learning and Coordinated Community Response to
Disasters

Brought to you by | University of Central Florida - UCF
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/19/19 7:17 PM

6

JHSEM: Vol. 7 [2010], No. 1, Article 45

Public sector leadership and utilization of information technology can play
an important role in this learning and network coordination (Kapucu 2006, 2009;
Comfort 1999).
Methods
The authors reviewed Florida State Emergency Response Team (SERT) situation
reports before, during, and after the hurricanes. SERT produced Situation Reports
that were made available to the public daily and weekly that outlined current
response efforts being monitored through the State Emergency Operation Center
(EOC). Content analysis was conducted on all situation reports for each of the
four storms. The data collection process numbered and catalogued organizations
involved in the responses, the date and storm was recorded, and agency contact,
sector, and source of funding were also noted. The transactions reported are
focused on the response effort monitored by SERT situation reports. The Orlando
Sentinel was available for content analysis and was chosen because of its
proximity to three of the four major storms (Charley, Frances, and Jeanne) and its
central location in the state. The three major hurricanes directly hit central Florida
(see Figure 1 for the paths of the hurricanes). Because there were no reported
storms in June or July of the 2004 hurricane season content analysis began with
the August 1, 2004 issue and ran through November 30, 2004. Each issue was
reviewed for articles that detailed community response to storm preparation,
storm action, or post-storm responses. Each entry was numbered by date, the
organizations were listed as separate entries and given organization numbers, the
contact, sector, and source of funding were identified, and the transaction was
recorded. Organizations that worked together and shared knowledge and
resources to accomplish a task were noted.
Four interviews were conducted with respondents whose counties were
impacted by three or more hurricanes during 2004 hurricane season. The purpose
of these interviews was to assess respondents’ views regarding the adequacy of
current efforts and the role of emergency managers in the process. These
interviews provide additional insight and understanding of current emergency
management efforts.
Data collected from the content analyses were analyzed using the
UCINET 6.0 social network analysis software program. UCINET is a
comprehensive program for the analysis of social networks. The program contains
several network analysis routines (e.g., centrality measures, dyadic cohesion
measures, positional analysis algorithms, and clique etc.), and general statistical
and multivariate analysis tools such as multidimensional scaling, correspondence
analysis, factor analysis, cluster analysis, and multiple regression (Borgatti,
Everett, and Freeman 2002). Social network analysis measures the relations in a
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network and provides a comprehensive picture of the network relationship
(Mandell and Tsai 2007).
Findings and Results
Organizational learning depends on the development of a usable knowledge and
information infrastructure to support inter-organizational operations among the
multiple agencies that make up the potential response system. In the following
section, network analysis for each hurricane individually is presented first; and
second, network analysis of the system used to respond to the four hurricanes
during the six week duration of the response in 2004.
Multi-organizational Collaboration in Response to Four Hurricanes
In response to Hurricane Francis, a total of 69 organizations participated in
mitigation and response activities with 48 (69.7%) being public organizations.
When we examine the public organizations by jurisdictions, it shows that the
majority of the organizations, 16, are county organizations, followed by state (14),
city (9), federal (9), and regional (0) organizations. It is noteworthy that the
second dominant group is private with 13 organizations (18.84%). Lastly, 8
(11.59%) were nonprofit organizations. In response to Hurricane Ivan, a total of
74 organizations participated in response and mitigation activities with the largest
percentage pertaining to public organizations (75.68%). When we examine the
public organizations by jurisdictions, it shows that the majority of the
organizations, 31, are county organizations, followed by state (12), federal (6),
city (5), and regional (2) organizations. It is noteworthy that the second dominant
group is private with 10 organizations (13.51%). Lastly, 8 (10.81%) were
nonprofit organizations. In response to Hurricane Jeanne, a total of 95
organizations participated in response and mitigation activities with the largest
percentage pertaining to public organizations (73.68%). When we examine the
public organizations by jurisdictions, it shows that the majority of the
organizations, 27, are county organizations, followed by state (19), city (12),
federal (11), and regional (1) organizations. It is again noteworthy that the second
dominant group is private with 19 organizations (20%). Only 6 (6.32%) were
nonprofit organizations.
Table 1 presents the numerical distribution of the organizations involved
in response activities in 2004. In response to Hurricane Charley, a total of 144
organizations participated in mitigation and response activities with 87 (60.42%)
being public organizations. When we examine the public organizations by
jurisdictions it shows that the majority of the organizations, 34, are county
organizations, followed by city (20), state (18), federal (11), and regional (4). It is
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noteworthy that the second dominant group is private organizations with 47
(32.64%). Last, 10 (6.94%) organizations were nonprofit. Public organizations
played a significant role in the response operations, followed by private; and,
there didn’t seem to be much interaction between organizations.
Type
Public-federal
Public-state
Public-regional
Public-county
Public-city
Public-total
Non profit
Private
Total

Charley
#
%

Frances
#
%

Ivan
#

%

Jeanne
#
%

11
18
4
34
20
87
10
47
144

9
14
0
16
9
48
8
13
69

6
12
2
31
5
56
8
10
74

8%
16%
3%
42%
7%
76%
11%
14%
100%

11
19
1
27
12
70
6
19
95

8%
13%
3%
24%
14%
60%
7%
33%
100%

13%
20%
0%
23%
13%
70%
12%
19%
100%

12%
20%
1%
28%
13%
74%
6%
20%
100%

Source: content analyses of SERT situation reports and newspaper news reports.

Table 1: Organizational Response to Hurricanes in 2004
Figure 3 illustrates the numbers of organizations involved in response to
the four hurricanes in 2004. Table 1 and Figure 2 show a significant decrease in
the number of responding organizations from Hurricane Charley to Hurricane
Ivan (the third hurricane). This can be interpreted as a sign of complacency of
government agencies in coordinating the response operations. A similar trend was
identified in terms of individual citizens’ response to the hurricanes in 2004 by
Wang and Kapucu (2008). In addition, it might also be due to the overall impact
of the hurricanes, each of which had a different path and different strength. For
example, while Hurricane Charley had significantly hit the State, Hurricane Ivan’s
impact was limited. Lastly, the lower number of organizations responding in later
phases of the period may be attributed to the uniqueness of the case itself. Four
consecutive hurricanes is not a situation emergency managers and responders face
very often.
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Source: content analyses of SERT situation reports and newspaper news reports.

Figure 3: Actors Involved in Response to Four Hurricanes, 08/11/04 - 11/30/04
Measuring Hurricane Network Coordination: Network Analysis
The number of organizations that responded to the four hurricanes presented in
the previous section provides some valuable information about an overall picture
of the response operations. The following section focuses on analyzing
organizations’ relationships to other agencies (actors) in the response system
using network analysis tools and techniques. For example, network centralization
can provide a valuable perspective. Simply speaking, degree centrality denotes the
number of ties an organization has with different organizations. Organizations
that have more ties with others have higher degree centrality. Network
centralization is 100% when the network is a pure star network in which one actor
(organization) has ties with all other actors (organizations), and all others only
have one tie to the central actor (organization). In other words, in a star network,
there is one central actor (organization) that holds the maximum degree of
centrality while all others hold the minimum degree of centrality. Calculations for
centrality during the response to the four Hurricanes show: Hurricane Charley
10.02%; Hurricane Frances 9.58%; Hurricane Ivan 6.14%; Hurricane Jeanne
15.55%. This summary measure of centralization is an indicator of a loosely
coupled network in every case with Hurricane Ivan being the weakest. Being low
on degree centrality is preferable during disaster response because it indicates
there are ties between organizations and not just to a central actor (organization).
More ties between organizations in a disaster response network are preferable
because there is greater exchange of information and resources (see Table 2).
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In network analysis, three types of centrality reveal interesting
characteristics about the network: degree centrality, closeness centrality, and
betweenness centrality (Comfort and Haase 2006; Kapucu 2006). In all centrality
measures mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values allow
evaluation of the position and role of actors in the network. Table 2 presents the
measures of degree centrality. Degree centrality gives us information about the
frequency of organizational interactions in the network. According to degree
centrality, organizations that have more ties (interactions) will be more powerful
and advantaged. Therefore it is important to observe each organization’s degree
centrality to determine key players.

Network
Centralization
Heterogeneity
Normalized

Charley

Frances

Ivan

Jeanne

10.02%
5.55%
5.06%

9.58%
6.72%
5.94%

6.14%
6.64%
5.89%

15.55%
6.68%
6.04%

Nrm
Degree
Degree Degree
Mean
0.77
0.40
0.69
Std Dev
2.41
1.24
1.85
Sum
150.00
77.32
84.00
Variance
5.81
1.54
3.44
Minimum
0.00
0.00
0.00
Maximum
20.00
10.31
12.00
NOTE: NrmDegree = normed degree

Nrm
Degree
0.58
1.55
70.00
2.39
0.00
10.00

Degree
0.51
1.38
64.00
1.91
0.00
8.00

Nrm
Degree
0.41
1.12
51.61
1.25
0.00
6.45

Degree
0.77
2.27
112.00
5.15
0.00
23.00

Nrm
Degree
0.53
1.57
77.24
2.45
0.00
15.86

10 Organizations That Have Highest Degree Centrality
Charley
Name
OCOEM
FEMA
FDEM
OrCG
FSGGO
ARC
PEF
USG
OsCG
AC

Frances
Degree
20
19
11
9
8
7
6
4
4
3

Name
FEMA
OrCG
ARC
FSGGO
USG
OCOEM
FNG
FDEM
SJRWMD
LaCG

Ivan
Degree
12
8
8
8
7
5
4
3
2
2

Name
FDEM
FEMA
OrCG
OCOEM
ARC
FSGGO
USG
LA
PCC
FNG

Jeanne
Degree
8
7
6
6
5
4
4
2
2
2

Name
FDEM
FEMA
DCF
USG
LaCG
OCOEM
OrCG
FSGGO
PoC
HCCHInc

Degree
23
9
8
4
4
4
4
4
3
3

Table 2: Degree Centrality Statistics for the Four Hurricanes in Florida
Closeness centrality indicates how close an actor (organization) is to all
other actors (organizations) in the network (Wasserman and Faust 1994). This
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measure is useful in terms of estimating the flow of information through a
network by assuming that if the actors (organizations) are close to one another
that the exchange of information and sharing of resources occurs more quickly
(Comfort and Haase, 2006). Closeness centrality approaches the network from the
perspective of connectivity among organizations. In order to explain closeness
centrality, we may use an example from the emergency response network to
Hurricane Charley. FEMA supplied resources to Florida Division of Emergency
Management (FDEM) for operations in response to Hurricane Charley. The
federal resources were distributed by FDEM to County Emergency Operation
Centers (EOCs). In this situation, Orange County EOC (OCEOC) received FEMA
resources through Florida SERT; therefore, OCEOC’s geodesic distance to
FEMA for resource allocation appears to be two in the network analysis, meaning
that OCEOC was ‘two steps’ away from federal resources. If OCEOC had
directly received the federal resources from FEMA, its farness (geodesic distance)
would have been one.
The statistics in Table 3 show high means of “farness” for all four
networks which means on average all organizations are far from each other in
terms of the number of steps it takes to communicate with each other. There are
144 actors in the Hurricane Charley network and the “farness” of the closest actor,
Orange County Office of Emergency Management (OCOEM), is 29707; that is,
calculated total geodesic distances from OCOEM to all other actors in the
network is 29707. If OCOEM had direct connection to all other actors then this
number would be 143 (144-1). Thus, even the closest or, the most central actor in
Hurricane Charley is quite far from other actors or, has not a big centrality power
in the network. The result is similar in other networks. Actors in the networks are
not close; therefore, we can at least conclude that communication and
coordination in the network system is not at the expected level as planned in the
state and county comprehensive emergency management plans.

Mean

Charley
inFarness
37642.742

inClsnss

Frances
inFarness

0.516

14307.322

inClsnss

Ivan
inFarness

0.841

15420.168

inClsnss

Jeanne
inFarness

inClsnss

0.804

21071.082

0.688

Std Dev

858.074

510.503

622.037

502.57

298.796

0.017

327.73

0.012

Sum

7340335

100.559

1731186

101.704

1927521

100.56

3076378

100.5

Variance

736291.125

0

386930.344

0.002

89279.273

0

107407.047

0

Minimum

29707

0.513

12270

0.826

13407

0.8

18862

0.685

Maximum

37830

0.653

14520

0.978

15500

0.925

21170

0.769

NOTE: SSQ = Sum of Squares; MCSSQ = Mean Centered Sum of Squares; Euc Norm =
Euclidean Norm; inClsnss= inCloseness; outClsnss = outCloseness
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10 Organizations That Have Highest Closeness Centrality
Charley

Frances

Ivan

Jeanne

Name

Frnss

Clsns

Name

Frnss

Clsns

Name

Frnss

Clsns

Name

Frnss

Clsns

OCOEM
PoC
FEMA
AC
OsCG
ARC
FNG
FSGGO
KUA
OCU

29707
33396
33569
33586
33599
36280
36285
36474
37057
37057

0.653
0.581
0.578
0.578
0.577
0.535
0.535
0.532
0.524
0.524

OCOEM
SA
CiOr
SJRWMD
WESH
FHP
FEMA
ARC
OrCG
FSGGO

12270
12380
12389
12392
12392
12400
12489
12492
12495
12503

0.978
0.969
0.969
0.968
0.968
0.968
0.961
0.961
0.96
0.96

OCOEM
OCCC
FEMA
ARC
FNG
FSGGO
OrCG
LA
EMAC
AL

13407
14152
14266
14267
14519
14636
14636
15252
15253
15253

0.925
0.876
0.869
0.869
0.854
0.847
0.847
0.813
0.813
0.813

DCF
SeCG
OCOEM
PoC
FEMA
ARC
PEF
OS
OUC
OsCG

18862
18875
19582
20016
20155
20592
20737
20737
20737
20880

0.769
0.768
0.74
0.724
0.719
0.704
0.699
0.699
0.699
0.694

NOTE: inClsnss = inCloseness

Table 3: Closeness Centrality Statistics for the Four Hurricanes in Florida
Table 4 presents the measure of betweenness centrality. Betweenness is a
measure of the extent to which an actor lies in the direct path between two other
actors (Wasserman and Faust 1994). It is the degree or the extent to which a node
contributes to the overall sum of maximum interaction among other nodes.
Having greater betweenness centrality means that more actors depend on that
actor. In the example above, since FDEM connects OCOEM and FEMA it gains
betweenness power. However if OCOEM and FEMA can interact directly or
through another organization like the Florida State Government – Governor’s
Office (FSGGO) then the OCEOC will lose its betweenness power because
OCEOC and FEMA have more than two optional ways to interact. For evaluation
purposes it is better if the network has a smaller betweenness mean. In the
absence of a bridging organization a communication breakdown will occur,
because the network structure in this or another way limits direct contact and
increases reliance on network peers for effective and faster results. From another
perspective, some organizations like FEMA, state and county operations centers,
etc. should have more betweenness power than others, because it is their
responsibility to connect response activities.
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Mean
Std Dev
Sum
Variance
Minimum
Maximum
Network
Centralization Index

13

Charley

Frances

Ivan

Jeanne

Betweenness
0.774
5.56
151
30.914
0
69.833

Betweenness
2.529
13.899
306
193.187
0
111

Betweenness
0.52
2.844
65
8.086
0
24

Betweenness
0.397
2.24
58
5.017
0
20

0.19%

0.77%

0.16%

0.09%

10 Organizations That Have Highest Betweenness Centrality
Charley
Frances
Ivan

Jeanne

Name
FEMA
OrCG
AC
FSGGO
PEF
OsCG
ARC
HHS
VoCG

Btwnss
69.833
22
20
15.5
9
6.5
4
2
0.5

Name
OrCG
FEMA
FSGGO
ARC
FNG
SJRWMD
AZ
CT
CO

Btwnss
111
86
47.5
45
11
5.5
0
0
0

Name
OrCG
FEMA
FSGGO
FDEM
ARC
FNG
AZ
AK
DC

Btwnss
24
14.5
14
6.5
4
2
0
0
0

Name
EMAC
DCF
PoC
OrCG
FSGGO
SLCG
BCGov
SeCG
PEF

Btwnss
20
14
11
4
4
2
1
1
0.5

SeCG

0.5

FL

0

FL

0

OUC

0.5

NOTE: Btwnss = Betweenness

Table 4: Betweenness Centrality Statistics for the Four Hurricanes in Florida
For Hurricane Charley, the maximum betweenness is 69.833 while the
mean of betweenness for the network is 0.774, and standard deviation of the
network is 5.560. The network centralization index is 0.19%. This shows the
overall betweenness power is significantly low. That means an actor in the
network is not very dependent on some actors if it desires to communicate with
others. For hurricane Frances, the maximum betweenness is 111.000 while the
mean of betweenness for the network is 2.529, and standard deviation of the
network is 13.899. The network centralization index is 0.77% and this shows the
overall betweenness power is significantly low. Again, that means an actor in the
network is not very dependent on some actors to communicate with others. Based
on the closeness data presented above, it seems that no organization is dependent
on any other single organization for communication with others, but many
organizations in the network do need somebody for communication with others.
Organizations just have a choice, decreasing dependence on one, but the need for
somebody to broker communication is still there. For Hurricane Ivan, the
maximum betweenness is 24.000 while the mean of betweenness for the network

Brought to you by | University of Central Florida - UCF
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/19/19 7:17 PM

14

JHSEM: Vol. 7 [2010], No. 1, Article 45

is 0.520. And standard deviation of the network is 2.844. The network
centralization index is 0.16% which shows the overall betweenness power is
significantly low. That again means an actor in the network is not very dependent
on some actors to communicate with others. For Hurricane Jeanne, the maximum
betweenness is 20.000 while the mean of betweenness for the network is 0.397.
And, the standard deviation of the network is 2.240. The network centralization
index is 0.09%. This shows the overall betweenness power is significantly low.
And, that one more time means an actor in the network is not very dependent on
some actors to communicate with others.
Cliques as Subsets in a Coordination Network
Cliques are subsets of networks that develop recurring patterns of interaction in
the conduct of disaster operations. They are important in understanding the
constraints on the network. They usually develop in an effort to facilitate action
under stress; however, they may also inhibit the full exchange of information and
resources with other organizations in the network by excluding some from
exchange (Comfort and Haase, 2006). UCINET analysis identified cliques
composed of at least 3 organizations in the response network. Conversely, cliques
exemplify a fully collaborative sub-network in which all actors have a link with
each other. Therefore, in terms of organizational learning it could be argued that
since cliques represent a closely working subgroup dissemination of information
and knowledge between members of the clique should occur more easily. In other
words, coordination in the network is more likely to happen in closely working
subgroups or cliques.
Public
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Division of
Emergency Management, Orange County Government, Orange
County Office of Emergency Management

Private

Nonprofit

Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Florida State
Government - Governor's Office, Orange County Government,
Orange County Office of Emergency Management
Florida Division of Emergency Management, Orange County
Government, Orange County Office of Emergency Management
Charley

Orange County Government,
Emergency Management,

Orange

County Office

of

American
Red Cross
Orlando
Sentinel

AmeriCorps, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Osceola
County Government
Charlotte County Emergency Management, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, Florida State Government - Governor's
Office
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Division of
Emergency Management, Lake County Government
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Public
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Division of
Emergency
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Lake County
Government
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Orange County
Government
Federal Emergency Management, United States Government

Frances

Private

Nonprofit
American
Red Cross
American
Red Cross
American
Red Cross
American
Red Cross

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida National
Guard, Florida State Government - Governor's Office
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Division of
Emergency Management , Florida State Government - Governor's
Office
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Florida State
Government - Governor's Office, Orange County Government
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Florida State
Government - Governor's Office, United States Government
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Orange County
Government
Florida National Guard, Florida State Government - Governor's
Office, Orange County Office of Emergency Management

Ivan

Florida State Government - Governor's Office, Orange County
Office of Emergency Management, United States Government
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Division of
Emergency Management, Orange County Office of Emergency
Management
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Division of
Emergency Management, United States Government
Florida Division of Emergency Management , Orange County
Office of Emergency Management

Jeanne

Salvation
Army

American
Red Cross

Louisiana, Division of Emergency Management, United States
Government
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Division of
Emergency Management, Orange County Office of Emergency
Management
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Florida Division of
Emergency Management, St. Lucie County Government
Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Lake County
Government, Polk County

Table 5: Organizational Cliques Identified in Response to Hurricanes
Visual Representation of Network Coordination
Communications among different agencies and jurisdictions were difficult just
before and during the first and the second storm.1 By the third storm, however,
1 Interview with State Emergency Management Division, June 6, 2005.
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organizations were very good at communicating. The agencies that participated in
coordination include the Sheriff’s office, local fire departments, municipalities,
road crews, and the public. One of the examples is that the city worked with
citizens who were engaged within each neighborhood, trained those citizens, and
provided neighborhood key leaders with updates on what was being done. Finally,
the use of Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) in every
neighborhood provided a close social connection to those members of the
community who may have been disconnected from the community at large, such
as those who do not speak English, the poor, and the homeless (Weaver 2004).
Three months before the hurricanes, the City of Orlando had a series of
table top exercises, sat down with key players and discussed the impact on Central
Florida. During the exercises, the City brought in public works personnel and
contractors, who were responsible for debris removal. They went through the
process, demonstrated coordination, and answered important questions. Such
early preparedness efforts significantly helped during the hurricanes.2 Howwever,
one of the biggest difficulties was still communication among different
neighborhood groups. Orange County did not have the inner connectivity during
the hurricanes because neighborhood services were not a part of the EOC. After
several hurricanes, the County had inner connectivity.3 The Seminole County
public safety director repeatedly mentioned the importance of information
technology utilization among responding agencies and coordination with other
jurisdictions, neighboring counties, for example.4

2 Interview with City of Orlando, Office of Emergency Management, June 30, 2005
3 Interview with Orange County Office of Emergency Management, July 19, 2005.
4 Interview with Seminole County, Office of Emergency Management, July 15, 2005.
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NOTE: See the appendix 1 for abbreviations. Circles (or blue) = Nonprofits, Squares (or red) =
Public, Diamonds (or green) = Privat

Figure 4: Inter-organizational Network in Response to Hurricane Charley
Figure 4 depicts the overall network of 144 organizations interacting in
response to Hurricane Charley. Only 53 of 144 organizations identified in the
content analyses that they interacted, communicated, and shared resources with at
least one other organization in response to Hurricane Charley. By interaction we
mean inter-organizational communication, sharing information, exchanging
resources, or other forms of interaction. An analysis of network centrality
identifies those actors who are the most important in shaping the performance of
the network, as they have most ties with other actors (Wasserman and Faust
1994). In this diagram we observe that FEMA and OCOEM played central roles
in the network. ARC, FSGGO, and FDEM can be counted as second-degree
central actors. Also, it should be noted that many actors have only one connection
and that single connection is with one of the central actors.
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NOTE: See the appendix 1 for abbreviations. Circles (or blue) = Nonprofits,
Squares (or red) = Public, Diamonds (or green) = Private

Figure 5: Inter-organizational Network in Response to Hurricane Frances
Figure 5 depicts the overall network of 69 organizations interacting in
response to Hurricane Frances. Only 32 of 69 organizations identified in the
content analyses that they interacted, communicated and shared resources with at
least one other organization in response to Hurricane Frances. In this network it
can quickly be seen that FEMA is the most central actor, which mainly performs
liaison duty. We observe FEMA creates an interaction or communication circle
around itself. Within this first level circle there are some additional key actors like
ARC, OCOEM, FSGGO, and OrCG that jointly create a second-level circle. Firstlevel actors have direct connection to FEMA whereas second-level actors are two
steps away from FEMA. This means that they are connected to FEMA through
another organization in first-level circle. First-level circle actors generally
interacted with each other; however, second-level circle actors did not.
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NOTE: See the appendix 1 for abbreviations. Circles (or blue) = Nonprofits, Squares (or red) =
Public, Diamonds (or green) = Private

Figure 6: Inter-organizational Network in Response to Hurricane Ivan
Figure 6 depicts the overall network of 74 organizations interacting in
response to Hurricane Ivan. Only 28 of 74 organizations identified in the content
analyses that they interacted, communicated, and shared resources with at least
one other organization in response to Hurricane Ivan. At the very center of this
network we see FDEM. Although it does not have more connections than other
central players such as OCOEM, ARC, FEMA OrCG, FSGGO, it creates an
interaction circle that puts it at the center of the network.
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NOTE: See the appendix 1 for abbreviations. Circles (or blue) = Nonprofits, Squares (or red) =
Public, Diamonds (or green) = Private

Figure 7: Inter-organizational Network in Response to Hurricane Jeanne
Figure 7 depicts the overall network of 95 organizations interacting in
response to Hurricane Jeanne. Only 47 of 95 organizations identified in the
content analyses that they interacted, communicated and shared resources with at
least one other organization in response to Hurricane Jeanne. When compared to
networks of other hurricanes, Hurricane Jeanne’s network differs from others. For
example, some big groups are separated from the main network; and, in these
groups there are many actors connected to only other one actor that connects the
group to the main network. This makes the network more vulnerable, because if
one of the central players becomes dysfunctional, many actors will be
disconnected from the main network. For instance, what would happen if FDEM
experienced a communication problem, which is quite possible in a disaster like
hurricane?
Organizational coordination strategies employed are an important part of
community coordination and disaster response. Before Hurricane Charley in
August 2004 the last hurricane to make landfall was Irene in 1999, and one
tropical storm each in the 2001 and 2002 seasons. The irregular occurrence of
tropical activity prior to the 2004 hurricane season preconditioned emergency
managers, public officials, and the public to take stable conditions for granted. In
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preparation for the 2004 hurricane season, the City of Orlando practiced their
“response” to a large Category 4 hurricane that crossed the central section of the
state causing excessive wind damage to homes and trees and flooding.5 This
exercise was followed up by Hurricane Charley, a Category 4 hurricane – the first
to cross Central Florida since 1969.
Conclusion
This article addressed inter-organizational coordination and its impact on
collaborative capacity building in disaster environments. The study examined four
networks comprised of hurricane response operations, drawing on content
analyses of news and situation reports. Content analyses provided interorganizational interactions that are subject to network analysis revealing
information about: (1) how critical actors interacted and coordinated, (2) subgroups under each network, and (3) each network as a system. Using network
analysis in analyzing disaster response systems is a new way of exploring the
issues from another perspective and through a new methodology. The article
showcases the potential use of network analysis in both organizational and
emergency management research.
Effectiveness in this study is defined as collaborative capacity building in
response to disasters and emergencies. Organizational learning offers a mode of
improving inter-organizational coordination in response to disasters in building
capacity. This research acknowledges that change in performance needs to occur
within organizations, among organizations within a single jurisdiction, and
between jurisdictions engaged in response to disasters. The research builds on the
human ability to learn and adapt to new information, but acknowledges that this
capacity can only occur with the support of an appropriate information
infrastructure. Complex disaster response operations lie beyond the capacity of an
individual organization and require a coordinated effort. Organizations in
response to four hurricanes in six weeks needed to identify sources of
information, collect information, make sense of information and confer meaning,
to put knowledge into action based on experience.
The network analysis conducted was based on situation reports and news
articles. It indicates that there was no significant difference among coordinated
response to four hurricanes. In other words, there was a failure to learn at the
network level. Reasons for this failure can be considered from an organizational
perspective, as well as from the network-level analysis. Research has shown that
organizations in the midst of or immediately following a crisis are not ready to
learn (Donahue and Tuohy 2006). For instance, Kovoor-Misra and Nathan (2000)
5 Interview with City of Orlando, Office of Emergency Management, June 30, 2005
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suggest that organizations will go through three phases following a crisis:
defensiveness, openness, and forgetfulness. The organization will most likely seek
to engage in a reflective learning process in the openness phase. Before that,
organization members are likely to be defensive, trying to insulate themselves and
their organization from criticism. Over time, the organizations will move to a
period where the members feel comfortable asking questions about what
happened, what values embedded in the organization might detract from
performance, and so on. However, this phase is fleeting, as organizations seek to
return to their normal routine (Roux-Dufort 2000) and forget the need for possible
change.
Kovoor-Misra and Nathan (2000) raise an important question for learning
during repeated threats of disaster. How much time is necessary for learning to
occur, where openness to change is prolonged? In the case of Florida hurricanes,
we suggest there was not enough time between storm systems to allow
organizations and the entire response network to openly question values, relations,
or performance. It is also possible that the initial network structure did not allow
for collaborative learning activity, in which multiple organizations would reflect
with each other to consider values, relations, and performance. The closeness
centrality figures showed that actors within the network were not ‘close enough’
to each other for better and more effective interaction and network coordination.
There was relatively little close contact among most of the organizations
providing emergency response services.
Thus, one recommendation might be for more pre-season planning, open
communication among emergency managers and elected officials, and the use of
technology to provide for a more connected and coordinated response. Interview
respondents discussed such activity, which enabled a certain level of coordinated
response; however, more may be necessary to encourage learning in the event of
repeated disasters. The repeated disaster scenario suggests that emergency
managers must vigilantly work to keep the public agencies, nonprofit
organizations, and private organizations informed and apprised of the seriousness
of the situation.
One of the important limitations of this study is the use of secondary
sources that might be biased in this or another sense. While it is acknowledged
that situational reports and Orlando Sentinel are potential sources for bias, it was
still important to have an outsider view and perspective rather than be subject to a
specific organization’s perceptions. It is strongly believed that secondary sources
are more objective than specific agencies’ possible comments from interviews or
surveys administered for that purpose. Moreover, situational reports were not
prepared as a response to our study and were merely a result of agencies’ daily
operations, which makes them more objective. It was also within the limits of the
research capabilities that the authors used only two sources for the study.
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Appendix 1: Abbreviation of Organization mentioned in the paper
AC
AK
AL
ARC
AZ
BCGov
CiOr
CO
CT
DC
DCF
EMAC
FDEM
FEMA
FHP
FL
FNG
FSGGO
HCCHInc
HHS
KUA
LA
LaCG
OCCC
OCOEM
OCU
OrCG
OS
OsCG
OsCSD
OUC
PCC
PEF
PoC
SA
SeCG
SJRWMD
SLCG
USGC
VoCG
WESH

AmeriCorps
Alaska
Alabama
American Red Cross
Arizona
Brevard County Government
City of Orlando
Colorado
Connecticut
District of Columbia
Department of Children and Families
Emergency Management Assistance Compact
Florida Division of Emergency Management
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
Florida Highway Patrol
Florida
Florida National Guard
Florida State Government - Governor's Office
Health Care Center for Homeless Inc.
Health and Human Services
Kissimmee Utility Authority
Louisiana
Lake County Government
Orange County Convention Center
Orange County Office of Emergency Management
Orange County Utilities
Orange County Government
Orlando Sentinel
Osceola County Government
Osceola County School District
Orlando Utilities Commission
Pensacola Civic Center
Progress Energy Florida
Polk County
Salvation Army
Seminole County Government
St Johns River Water Management District
St. Lucie County Government
United States Government - Congress
Volusia County Government
WESH-Channel 2
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